One
man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down
to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to do
this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor,
and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know
what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes,
and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper
fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the
game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a
good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes
on to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in
season.- Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus
without observing it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary, the
observation of what a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is
characteristic of the social animal to perceive that he is working in
a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also
should perceive it.- It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not
rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou wilt
become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled
by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand
the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou
wilt omit any social act.
(podcast episode) (original Greek)
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